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Abstract
Malicious software is one of the most serious cyber threats on the Internet today. Traditional
malware detection has proven unable to keep pace with the sheer number of malware because
of their growing complexity, new attacks and variants. Most malware implement various
metamorphic techniques in order to disguise themselves, therefore preventing successful
analysis and thwarting the detection by signature-based anti-malware engines. During the
past decade, there has been an increase in the research and deployment of anti-malware
engines powered by machine learning, and in particular deep learning, due to their ability
to handle huge volumes of malware and generalize to never-before-seen samples. However,
there is little research about the vulnerability of these models to adversarial examples. To fill
this gap, this paper presents an exhaustive evaluation of the state-of-the-art approaches for
malware classification against common metamorphic attacks. Given the limitations found
in deep learning approaches, we present a simple architecture that increases 14.95% the
classification performance with respect to MalConv’s architecture. Furthermore, the use of
the metamorphic techniques to augment the training set is investigated and results show
that it significantly improves the classification of malware belonging to families with few
samples.
Keywords: Malware Analysis, Malware Classification, Software Obfuscation, N-gram
Extraction, Machine Learning, Deep Learning
1. Introduction
In today’s ever-connected society, cyber-
attacks have been dramatically increasing







in number and damage up to the point
that cyberthreats are ranked as a consis-
tent and persistent threat among the top
global risks1, along with weather extremes,
climate change and natural disasters. Some
estimates 2 predict that the cost of cyber-
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nually by 2021, rising from the 3 trillion in
2015. This estimate includes damage and
destruction of data, stolen money, lost pro-
ductivity, theft of personal, financial data
and intellectual property, fraud, disruption
of the normal course of business, forensic
investigation and reputational harm. Ac-
cording to MalwareBytes 3, there has been
an increase of 13% in the business threat
detections in 2019 with a dramatic spike in
detections of the malware Emotet at the be-
ginning of the year.
Malicious software is one of the most com-
mon methods employed by cybercriminals
to launch a cyberattack. Other methods in-
clude, but are not limited to, phishing, man-
in-the-middle attack, SQL injection, etc.
Every day, the AV-TEST Institute registers
over 350000 new malicious programs and
potentially unwanted applications (PUA).
In fact, the number of total malware has
more than doubled from the 470.01m in
2015 to 1065.61m in 20204. However, this
is not due to an increase in new malware
but to the reuse of well-established families
through the usage of code obfuscation tech-
niques to bypass detection engines. Thus,
to keep up with malware and be able to re-
duce its impact, it is necessary to improve
the computer systems’ cyberdefenses and in
particular, anti-malware engines, the last
layer of defense against a cyberattack and
the defensive layer responsible of prevent-
ing, detecting and removing malicious soft-
ware.
The fastest and most reliable method em-






known malware is by means of unique sig-
natures. Signatures are composed by se-
quences of bytes or data, to provide an iden-
tifier for each malicious software or group
of samples with similar capabilities or be-
havior. However, signatures cannot de-
tect against unknown malware because a
new signature has to be developed previ-
ously. Consequently, signature-based detec-
tion only protects against known malware.
Another problem is that malware can al-
ter its signature to avoid detection by sim-
ply modifying the code while preserving its
functionality and behavior. Furthermore, as
new malware appears every day, it is neces-
sary to store large amounts of signatures,
demanding considerable storage, making
slow to search a particular signature, and
affecting system performance (Amro and
Alkhalifah, 2015).
Due to the sheer volumes of new mal-
ware variants being deployed every day,
anti-malware solutions that rely solely on
signatures have become obsolete. During
the past decade, there has been an increase
in the research and deployment of anti-
malware engines powered by machine learn-
ing (Gibert et al., 2020b; Ucci et al., 2019;
Souri and Hosseini, 2018) to complement
signature-based detection due to their abil-
ity to handle huge volumes of data and gen-
eralize to never-before-seen malware. This
is achieved by summarizing complex rela-
tionships among features that are discrim-
inative between malware and goodware or
between malware families, allowing the de-
tection engine to adapt to the modifica-
tions in malware’s code. However, there
is little research about the susceptibility of
these models to adversarial samples. Most
state-of-the-art approaches (Demetrio et al.,
2019; Kolosnjaji et al., 2018; Suciu et al.,
2019) investigated how slight permutations
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generated by appending bytes at the end of
sections or at the end of the file can produce
misclassifications. Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches are based on modifications that
only affect the structure of the Portable Ex-
ecutable files. None of them modify the ac-
tual source code of the executables. Thus,
they greatly differ from the modifications
performed by real-word malware to gener-
ate variants of itself.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap.
To this end, this work provides an exten-
sive evaluation of state-of-the-art detectors
powered by machine learning (ML) against
common metamorphic techniques. More
specifically, the performance of the ML ap-
proaches is assessed against the modifica-
tions performed by the following metamor-
phic techniques:
• The dead code insertion technique.
• The registers reassignment technique.
• The subroutine reordering technique.
• The code reordering through jumps
technique.
Given the poor performance of the byte-
based deep learning approaches in the lit-
erature (Raff et al., 2018a; Krčál et al.,
2018; Gibert et al., 2018) in comparison to
the opcode-based approaches (Gibert et al.,
2017) due to their greater complexity and
the length of the input data, we propose a
shallow architecture that improves 14.95%
and 16.38% with respect to MalConv (Raff
et al., 2018a) and DeepConv (Krčál et al.,
2018) architectures. Instead of learning
complex and deep patterns, our architec-
ture learns n-gram like features from the
malware’s binary content represented as a
sequence of bytes. This is achieved through
a convolutional layer with filters of various
sizes that act as feature extractors. Fur-
thermore, we investigate the usage of the
aforementioned metamorphic techniques to
augment the dataset and reduce class im-
balance. The generalization performance
of the ML approaches has been evaluated
on a standard public benchmark provided
by Microsoft for the Big Data Innovators
Gathering Anti-Malware Prediction Chal-
lenge (Ronen et al., 2018) for reproducibil-
ity purposes.
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides the background.
Section 3 introduces state-of-the-art ap-
proaches to bypass ML malware detectors.
Section 4 describes the metamorphic tech-
niques employed by malware authors to
modify the executables. Section 5 presents
the ML approaches evaluated in this work.
Section 6 presents the results of the exper-
imentation. Finally, Section 7 summarizes
the concluding remarks and presents some
future lines of research.
2. Background
This section introduces the task of mal-
ware classification, it presents an overview
of malware, the Portable Executable (PE)
file format and the methods employed by
malware authors to evolve malware.
2.1. The Task of Malware Detection and
Classification
Malware detection refers to the task of
identifying whether or not a given file is ma-
licious to a computer system. By malicious
we refer to code that is harmful to the sys-
tem. Malware might seek to invade, damage
or disable partially or completely the com-
puter system, often taking control of it. De-
pending on their purpose, malware can be
divided into various, not mutually exclusive
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general categories including, but not limited
to adware, spyware, trojans, rootkit, virus,
worms, ransomware, etc. These categories
provide a general overview of the function-
ality and behavior of malware. Typically,
malware is also identified by a family name.
A malware family refers to a collection of
malware that has been generated from the
same code base. Furthermore, malware
families are divided into variants or strains,
that is, malware built from an existing code
base that have different signatures that are
not included in the list of signatures used
by anti-malware solutions. Distinguishing
and classifying different types of malware is
known as the task of malware classification
and it provides information to better un-
derstand how the malware has infected the
computers or devices, their threat level and
how to protect against them.
2.2. The Portable Executable File Format
Malicious software targeting the Win-
dows operating system is commonly written
using the Portable Executable (PE) format,
a file format for executable, object code,
DLLs and others used in 32-bit and 64-bit
versions of the Windows operations system.
Portable Executables contain the informa-
tion necessary for the Windows operating
system to run the executable code including
dynamic library references for linking, API
export and import tables, etc. A Portable
Executable file consists of headers and sec-
tions that tell the dynamic linker how to
map the file into memory. An overview
of the PE file is shown in Figure 1. The
PE Header includes information regarding
to the number of sections, their sizes, char-
acteristics of the file, the import address ta-
ble (IAT), etc. Furthermore, the PE file is

















Figure 1: Portable Executable File Format
and data of the executable, including, but
not limited to:
• the .text section. This section keeps
the actual code of the computer pro-
gram although the code can be written
in any other section.
• the .data section. This section is used
to declare initialized data or constants
that do not change at runtime.
• the .rsrc section. This section contains
all the resources of the program.
Detailed information of the PE file format
can be found in the documentation provided
by Microsoft5.
2.3. Malware Evolution
Malware is constantly evolving and seek-
ing new ways to bypass detection engines.
The proliferation of malware has increased
mainly due to the use of polymorphic and
metamorphic techniques employed by mal-




the true behavior of the executables. In
polymorphic malware, a polymorphic en-
gine is used to mutate the code while keep-
ing the original functionality intact. The
two most common methods to hide code are
packing and encryption. On the one hand,
packers employ one or more layers of com-
pression to hide the real code of the pro-
gram. Then, the original code is restored
into memory at runtime through the un-
packing routines and it is executed. On
the other hand, crypters encrypt malware or
part of its code to make it harder to analyze.
A crypter typically contains a stub used to
encrypt and decrypt malicious code. On the
contrary, metamorphic malware rewrites its
code to an equivalent version each time it
is propagated. Malware authors may em-
ploy various transformation techniques in-
cluding, but not limited to, register re-
naming, subroutine reordering and garbage
code insertion. Thanks to the combina-
tion of the aforementioned techniques, mal-
ware volumes rapidly grown, making foren-
sic investigations of malware cases time-
consuming, costly and difficult even for se-
curity analysts and experts.
The aforementioned circumstances force
security analysts and researchers to con-
tinually improve their cyberdefenses to
keep pace with the evolution of malware.
This caused the following problems with
traditional antivirus solutions that relied
on signature-based and heuristic/behavioral
methods. First, signatures cannot be used
to detect unknown malware variants be-
cause a new signature has to be developed
previously. Second, although behavior-
based detection is an effective approach to
analyze the file’s characteristics and behav-
ior to determine if the file is indeed mal-
ware, the scanning and analysis is very
time-consuming and can’t be applied to ev-
ery suspicious sample. Thus, researchers
started adopting machine learning to com-
plement their solutions and overcome the
prior pitfalls of traditional signature-based
engines and to provide an initial screening
of the samples that exhibit malicious traits,
as machine learning is well suited for pro-
cessing large volumes of data.
3. Related Work
Machine learning has become an appeal-
ing tool for anti-malware vendors for ei-
ther primary detection engines or as com-
plementary detection heuristics. This is
due to the ability of machine learning mod-
els to generalize to new samples, if the
models are properly regularized. Further-
more, machine learning models allow to
automatically summarize complex relation-
ships among features that are discrimina-
tive between malware and goodware or be-
tween malware families, depending on the
task, which allows the detection engine to
adapt to the modifications in the malicious
samples. For a complete review of ma-
chine learning solutions to detect and clas-
sify malware the reader is referred to the
following articles (Souri and Hosseini, 2018;
Ucci et al., 2019; Gibert et al., 2020b).
Although over the past decade there has
been an increase in the research and de-
ployment of machine learning solutions to
tackle the problem of malware detection and
classification, there is little research about
the vulnerability of these models to adver-
sarial attacks (Pitropakis et al., 2019; Mc-
graw et al., 2019). Most state-of-the-art
approaches (Demetrio et al., 2019; Kolos-
njaji et al., 2018; Suciu et al., 2019) investi-
gated how to slightly perturbate Portable
Executable files by appending carefully-
selected bytes at the end of the PE header
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or at the end of the file, to evade detec-
tion by a shallow CNN architecture based
on the raw bytes of the executable (Raff
et al., 2018b). For instance, Demetrio et al.
(2019) perturbed the bytes in the PE header
that are expected to maximally increase
the probability of evasion. On the other
hand, Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) appended
carefully-selected bytes at the end of the
file, where these bytes were selected in a
way that the resulting file minimizes the
confidence associated to the malicious class.
Unfortunately, for both approaches to work
they need to have access to the machine
learning model’s gradients, which is very
unlikely, if not impossible, to happen in a
real-world scenario. Furthermore, some ap-
proaches in the literature tried to automat-
ically learn which changes to perform to a
feature vector (Hu and Tan, 2017) or to the
actual executable (Anderson et al., 2018) in
order to bypass black-box detectors. More
specifically, Hu and Tan (2017) proposed a
GAN to generate adversarial examples by
modifying a binary feature vector, whose
features refer to the API functions added to
the import address table of the PE header of
an executable. For example, if M APIs are
used as features, an M-dimensional feature
vector is constructed, with all the features
corresponding to the imported API func-
tions set to 1, and the rest set to 0. Con-
trarily, Anderson et al. (2018) proposed a
reinforcement learning agent equipped with
a set of functionality preserving operations
like adding a function to the import address,
manipulate the names of the sections, ap-
pend bytes at the end of the file or between
sections, etc. However, these modifications
only affect the structure of the Portable Ex-
ecutables. None of them modify the actual
source code of the executables. Thus, they
greatly differ from the modifications per-
formed by real-world malware to generate
new variants of themselves.
The address the limitations of the afore-
mentioned adversarial attacks, this pa-
per performs an extensive investigation of
the vulnerability of state-of-the-art machine
learning approaches to realistic attacks al-
ready being employed by malware authors
to bypass detection. For a complete descrip-
tion of the attacks see Section 4.
4. Metamorphic Attacks
Malware authors usually employ meta-
morphic and polymorphic techniques to
change the form of each instance from gen-
eration to generation in order to evade
signature-based and pattern-matching de-
tection. On the one hand, polymorphic mal-
ware pairs with a polymorphic engine with
self-propagating code to continually change
its appearance by using encryption or pack-
aging algorithms to hide its code. On the
other hand, metamorphic malware rewrites
its code so that the newly propagated ver-
sion of itself no longer matches its previous
iterations. Metamorphic malware may use
multiple transformation techniques that in-
clude, but are not limited to, garbage code
or dead code insertion, register reassign-
ment, subroutine reordering and code re-
ordering through jumps. In this work we
focus on the transformations performed by
metamorphic techniques because they are
the ones that make alterations to the ac-
tual source code of malware. Following, the
most common metamorphic techniques are
described in more detail.
4.1. Dead Code Insertion
The insertion of dead code or do-nothing
instructions change the appearance of a
program while not affecting the execution
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of the original code. Examples of mal-
ware that added dead code instructions on
each generation are Evol and MetaPHOR.
Cf. Figure 2. Following are described the
dead code instructions implemented for our
research purposes.
• NOP. The NOP or no-op instruction
(short for no operation) is an as-
sembly language instruction that does
nothing.
• MOV Reg, Reg. The MOV instruc-
tion copies the contents of the register
referred by its second operand into the
register referred to by its firs operand.
• PUSH Reg; POP Reg. The PUSH
instruction places the register referred
to by its operand onto the top of the
stack in memory while the POP in-
struction removes the element from the
top of the stack.
• ADD Reg, 0. The ADD instruc-
tion adds the first and second operands,
storing the result in its first operand.
• SUB Reg, 0. The SUB instruction
subtracts the second operand from the
first operand and stores the result in its
first operand.
• INC Reg; DEC Reg. The INC in-
struction increments the content of the
register referred by its operand by one
while the DEC instruction decrements
the contents of the register by one.
• SHL Reg, 0. The SHL instruction
shifts the bits in its first operand’s con-
tents left, padding the resulting empty
bit positions with zero. The number of
bits to shift is specified by the second
operand.
• SHR Reg, 0. The SHR instruction
shifts the bits in its first operand’s
contents right, padding the resulting
empty bit positions with zero. The
number of bits to shift is specified by
the second operand.
Notice that the dead code instructions
PUSH Reg; POP Reg and INC Reg;
DEC Reg do not necessarily need to be
executed sequentially (one after the other).
The instructions can be alternated with
other instructions from the original code
that do not modify the same registers as
the do-nothing instructions.
Figure 2: Assembly language source code after the
insertion of a NOP instruction.
4.2. Register’s Reassignment
Register reassignment switches registers
from generation to generation while keeping
the program behavior unaltered. Cf. Fig-
ure 3. This technique was first used by
Win95/RegSwap virus. Traditional anti-
virus engines detect viruses that employ this
technique by a wildcard string search (Ször
and Ferrie, 2001). Wildcard strings allow to
skip particular bytes in regular expressions.
For instance, in "89 ?? 7C 10 4B 00", the
wildcard is indicated by ’??’.
4.3. Subroutine Reordering
The subroutine reordering technique em-
ploys permutations to reorder the subrou-
tines of a malware executable. Cf. Fig-
ure 4. With n different subroutines, this
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Figure 3: Register reassignment example. Registers ecx and ebx are switched to eax and edx, respectively.
technique can generate up to n! different
variants. The technique was initially em-
ployed by Win32/Ghost virus, which had
ten subroutines. Thus, it could generate
10! = 3, 628, 800 variants.
Figure 4: Subroutine reordering technique example.
4.4. Code Reordering through Jumps
Code reordering through jumps is based
on the insertion of conditional or uncondi-
tional jumps to split a subroutine into two
blocks of instructions. Afterwards, these
blocks generated by the branching instruc-
tion are permuted to change the control
flow. Cf. Figure 5. This technique was first
employed by Win95/ZPerm family to gen-
erate new variants jointly with the insertion
of garbage or dead code instructions.
5. Static Machine Learning Anti-
Malware Tools
There are multiple ways in which mal-
ware can be represented from a static anal-
ysis point of view. Typically, features are
Figure 5: Code reordering through jumps example.
manually-engineered to capture some spe-
cific characteristics of the executable that
can help distinguishing malware families or
malware from benign software, e.g. API
function calls, byte and opcode n-grams,
etc (Souri and Hosseini, 2018; Ucci et al.,
2019; Gibert et al., 2020b). In the present
study, the machine learning approaches are
limited to those whose performance would
be affected by the functionality-preserving
changes performed by the metamorphic at-
tacks described in Section 4. Accordingly,
the approaches assessed in this study can
be divided in two groups: (1) n-gram based
approaches or (2) deep learning approaches,
depending on whether they take as input a
feature vector containing an abstract repre-
sentation of the executable or directly raw
data.
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5.1. N-gram based Approaches
An n-gram is a contiguous sequence of
n items from a given sequence of text. N-
grams can be extracted from the hexadeci-
mal representation of malware’s binary con-
tent and from the assembly language source
code. On the one hand, the hexadecimal
representation represents the binary con-
tent of an executable as a sequence of bytes
(base-16 number representation with digits
[0-9] and [A-F]). Cf. Figure 6a. Alterna-
tively, the assembly language source code
contains the symbolic machine code of an
executable with metadata information as
function calls, memory allocation and vari-
able information. Cf. Figure 6b. In con-
sequence, byte n-grams (Zhang and Zhao,
2017; Raff and Nicholas, 2018) and opcode
n-grams (Santos et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2013)
refer to the unique combination of every n
consecutive bytes and opcodes as individual
features, respectively. An opcode refers to
the name of a specific instruction, i.e. ADD,
MUL, PUSH, etc, without its arguments.
N-gram based approaches construct a fea-
ture vector containing an abstract repre-
sentation of malware, where each element
in the vector indicates the number of ap-
pearances of a particular n-gram in the se-
quence of text. In consequence, the length
of the feature vector depends on the num-
ber of unique n-grams, which increases with
n. For instance, if we want to extract byte
n-grams with n = 3, the number of possible
n-grams is 2563 = 16.777.216. This leads to
two main problems. First, the resulting fea-
ture vector is too large to keep in memory,
even if malware n-grams do not increase ex-
ponentially with n but follow a Zipfian dis-
tribution (Raff et al., 2018c). Second, the
machine learning model will be affected by
the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 2015;
Chen, 2009) which means that the number
of samples in the dataset that need to be ac-
cessed to estimate a function with a given
level of accuracy grows exponentially with
the underlying dimensionality. As a result,
methods in the literature reduced the high
dimensional input space using feature selec-
tion techniques (Santos et al., 2013; Zhang
and Zhao, 2017) or the hashing trick (Raff
and Nicholas, 2018; Hu et al., 2013).
1. Feature selection is the process of se-
lecting a subset of relevant features
from the initial input space for use in
model construction. A common ap-
proach is to rank the features based
on the mutual information index in
decreasing order (Santos et al., 2013;
Zhang and Zhao, 2017). Mutual infor-
mation, is an index of statistical depen-
dence between two variables (Vergara
and Estévez, 2014). In the case of a
classification task, it measures the de-
pendence between a feature X and the
target variable Y. This is done by mea-
suring how much knowing one of these
variables reduces uncertainty about the
other. The mutual information be-
tween two variables is a non-negative
value, which measures the dependency
between the variables. For two inde-
pendent variables, their mutual infor-
mation will be 0. Otherwise, for de-
pendent variables, higher mutual infor-
mation mean higher dependency.
2. Feature hashing, also known as the
hashing trick, is a method for handling
sparse, high-dimensional feature vec-
tors by using a hash function to deter-
mine the feature’s location in a lower-
dimensional vector. It can be seen as a
random projection of the input space
A ∈ Rn to a low dimensional space
B ∈ Rm, where m  n. More specif-
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(a) Hexadecimal view of a PE file. Each
line is composed of the starting address
of the machine codes in the memory and
an accumulation of consecutive 16 byte
values.
(b) Assembly view of the grayed part
in Figure 6a. The first column repre-
sents the address, the second column
the byte sequence and the third column
the mnemonics sequence.
Figure 6: Hexadecimal and assembly view of a Portable Executable file.
ically, given an array of size N that
counts the number of times each n-
gram occurred, and a hash function,
the hashing trick maps each n-gram to
a location in the lower dimensional ar-
ray.
Afterwards, the resulting low-
dimensional feature vector is used for
training a classification algorithm. In our
experiments, we extracted 3-gram features
from both the hexadecimal view and the
assembly view. The high-dimensional
feature vector was reduced using feature
selection or the hashing trick. The size
of the resulting low-dimensional vector
is set to K = 5000 (different sizes for
K ∈ [500, 2000, 5000] were tried but
K = 5000 provides the best performance).
Afterwards, we trained various classifiers,
including a logistic regression classifier and
feed-forward neural networks consisting
of 1 to 3 hidden layers. The number of
neurons in the hidden layers was set to
2048, 1024 and 512 for the first, second
and third hidden layer, respectively. The
results presented in Section 6 show the
performance of the best classifiers, which
are referred using the following notation for
the rest of the paper:
• NN opcodes (hashing trick) refers to a
neural network with two hidden layers
trained with the opcode-based feature
vector reduced with the hashing trick
technique. Cf. Figure 7.
Figure 7: NN opcodes (hashing trick) architecture.
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• LR opcodes (mutual information)
refers to a logistic regression classifier
trained with the top K opcode-based
features selected using the mutual
information index. Cf. Figure 8.
Figure 8: LR opcodes (mutual information) archi-
tecture.
• NN bytes (hashing trick) refers to a
neural network with one hidden layer
trained with the byte-based feature
vector reduced with the hashing trick
technique. Cf. Figure 9.
Figure 9: NN bytes (hashing trick) architecture.
Notice that feature selection using the
mutual information metric has been only
applied to the opcode-based 3-grams. This
is because in the dataset used for training
there are 55136 and 9514156 unique opcode
and byte 3-grams, respectively, and in con-
sequence, the memory requirements needed
for selecting 5000 byte-based 3-gram fea-
tures far exceeds the memory capacity of
our system.
Instead of taking the number of appear-
ances of n-grams as features, data normal-
ization is applied to normalize the range of
the features. The motivation behind data
normalization is that the range of values of
each feature varies widely. Machine learn-
ing models learn a mapping from input vari-
ables to an output variable. In consequence,
the scale and distribution of the data drawn
from the domain may be different for each
variable or feature. For example, the num-
ber of times the 3-gram [mov, push, mov]
or the 3-gram [pop, sub, and] may greatly
differ. These differences in the scales across
input variables may increase the difficulty of
the problem being modeled. For instance,
large input values can result in a model
that learns large weight values, which are
known to be often unstable, i.e. it may suf-
fer from poor performance during learning
and sensitivity to input values resulting in
higher generalization error. Therefore, the
features have been standarized so that they
have zero-mean and unit-variance. The for-






where x is the original feature vector, µ is
the mean of the feature values and δ is the
standard deviation of the feature values.
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5.2. Deep Learning Approaches
The need for manual feature engineer-
ing can be obviated by automated feature
learning. Deep learning replaces the fea-
ture engineering process by an underlying
system which typically consists of a neu-
ral network with multiple layers, that per-
forms both feature learning and classifica-
tion. With deep learning, one can start
with raw data as features will be automati-
cally created by the neural network when it
learns. The main distinction between deep
learning approaches for malware detection
and classification lean on what they use as
raw data.
5.2.1. Opcode-based Approaches
Opcode-based approaches (Gibert et al.,
2017) take as input a sequence of assem-
bly language instructions extracted from
the assembly language source code of an
executable. Gibert et al. (2017) proposed a
shallow convolutional neural network to ex-
tract n-gram like features from malware’s
instructions. This is achieved by a convolu-
tional layer with filters of various sizes. In
their work, an assembly program is repre-
sented as a concatenation of mnemonics
x1:n = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn
where n is the length of the program and
xi ∈ Rk corresponds to the i-th mnemonic
in the program. Instead of representing
the mnemonics as one-hot vectors, each
mnemonic is represented as a word embed-
ding. Following, a convolutional layer ex-
tracts n-gram like features. This is achieved
by the convolution operator, which involves
a filter w ∈ Rhk where h is the number of
mnemonics to which is applied and k is the
size of the word embedding. In particular,
filters are applied to sequences containing
from 3, 5 and 7 mnemonics. Cf. Figure A.18
5.2.2. Byte-based Approaches
Byte-based approaches (Raff et al.,
2018a; Krčál et al., 2018; Gibert et al., 2018)
are those that take as input a sequence of
bytes extracted from the hexadecimal rep-
resentation of the malware’s binary content.
Cf. Figure 6a. These approaches face the
following challenges:
• By treating an executable as a sequence
of bytes, we are dealing with sequences
of millions of time steps, which turns
the task of malware detection and clas-
sification as one of the most challenging
sequence classification problems with
regard to the size of the time series (se-
quence of bytes).
• The meaning of any byte is dependent
on its context and could encode any
type of information, from binary code
to human-readable text, images, etc.
• The same instruction could be encoded
using different bytes depending on its
arguments. For instance, the bytes se-
quence corresponding to the cmp in-
struction can begin with 0x3C, 0x3D,
0x3A, 0x3B, 0x80, 0x81, 0x38 or 0x39
depending on the arguments given.
• The content of a Portable Executable
(PE) file exhibits various levels of
spatial correlation. Nearby instruc-
tions within the same funtion are spa-
tially correlated, but function calls and
jcc instructions produce discontinuities
over the code instructions and func-
tions. As a result, this discontinuities
are maintained through the bytes se-
quences.
Following it is provided a brief description
of the architectures evaluated in the present
study:
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Raff et al. (2018a) proposed an archi-
tecture that consists of an embedding layer,
a gated convolutional layer, a global max-
pooling layer to produce its activations re-
gardless of the location of the detected fea-
tures, followed by fully-connected layers.
This architecture will be called MalConv
from now on. Cf. Figure A.19.
Krčál et al. (2018) presented a deep con-
volutional neural network architecture that
consists of an embedding layer, four con-
volutions with strides and max-pooling be-
tween the second and third convolutions.
Afterwards, it follows a global average pool-
ing layer and various fully-connected layers.
This architecture will be called DeepConv
from now on. Cf. Figure A.20.
Gibert et al. (2018) presented a convo-
lutional neural network architecture to cat-
egorize malware based on their structural
entropy. The structural entropy of an ex-
ecutable is the representation of a file as a
stream of entropy values, where each value
describes the amount of entropy over a small
chunk of code in a specific location of the
file. Additionally, they proposed a multires-
olution CNN to classify malware based on
the approximation and details coefficients
generated by the Haar wavelet transform
over the entropy time series. The archi-
tectures will be called Structural entropy
CNN and Multiresolution CNN from now
on. Cf. Figures A.21, A.22.
5.2.3. Byte-based Shallow Convolutional
Neural Network
Byte-based approaches presented in the
literature (Raff et al., 2018a; Krčál et al.,
2018; Gibert et al., 2018) tend to underper-
form in comparison to the opcode-based ap-
proaches (Gibert et al., 2017) as it can be
observed in Section 6.3. Our intuition is
that the size of their filters and the com-
plexity of the network architectures played
a deep role. To check this premise, a shal-
low convolutional neural network architec-
ture similar to the one presented by Gibert
et al. (2017) has been proposed based on the
raw byte sequences.
The architecture differs in the input of the
network and in the size of the convolutional
filters. Instead of receiving the assembly
language instructions, the network takes as
input the hexadecimal representation of the
malware’s binary content represented as a
concatenation of bytes:
x1:n = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn
where n is the length of the program and
xi ∈ Rk corresponds to the i-th byte in the
program. The overall architecture is pre-
sented in Figure 10.
The network comprises the following lay-
ers:
• Input layer. The network takes as in-
put a sequence of bytes, of size N, rep-
resenting malware’s binary content.
• Embedding layer. Rather than per-
form convolutions on the raw byte val-
ues, each byte is mapped to a fixed
length feature vector (word embed-
ding) that is learnt during training.
Take into account that using raw byte
values would imply that certain byte
values are intrinsically closer to each
other than other byte values, which is
known a priori to be false, as the mean-
ing of the byte value is dependent on
the context.
• Convolutional layer. This layer con-
volves various filters over the byte se-
quences and extracts n-gram like fea-
tures from it. A convolution operation
13
Raw Bytes
4-dimensiomal EmbeddingN × 4
Conv 5 (stride 1)100Conv 3 (stride 1)100 Conv 7 (stride 1)100
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Feature Concatenation300
Softmax9
Figure 10: Convolutional neural network for malware classification from sequences of bytes.
involves a filter w ∈ Rhk where h is the
number of bytes to which is applied and
k is the size of the word embedding.
In particular, filters are applied to se-
quences containing 3,5 and 7 bytes.
A feature ci is generated from a window
of bytes xi:i+h−1 (it comprises all bytes
between position i and i + h − 1) and
is defined as follows:
ci = f(w · xi:i+h−1 + b),
where f is a rectifier linear unit (ReLU)
function and b the bias term.
• Pooling layer. Global max-pooling is
applied to extract the maximum acti-
vation of each of the feature map acti-
vations generated by the convolutional
layer.
• Softmax layer. It linearly combines
the features learned by the previous
layers and applies the softmax func-
tion to generate a vector containing
the normalized probability distribution
over malware families.
Other variants of this architecture includ-
ing dilated convolutions (Yu and Koltun,
2016) and gated linear units (Dauphin et al.,
2017) have been evaluated but as it can be
observed in Section 6.3, their performance
is slightly worse than the standard convolu-
tion. This variants are named Aatrous CNN
and CNN GLU, respectively.
6. Evaluation
This section presents an extensive eval-
uation of the robustness of state-of-the-
art detectors powered by ML against the
metamorphic techniques presented in Sec-
tion 4. The experiments are carried out us-
ing the data provided by Microsoft for the
Big Data Innovators Gathering Challenge
of 2015 (Ronen et al., 2018). Furthermore,
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we investigate the utility of the aforemen-
tioned metamorphic techniques to augment
the dataset and reduce class imbalance.
6.1. The Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge
Unlike other applications, the task of mal-
ware detection and classification has not re-
ceived much attention in the research com-
munity and unfortunately, there are not
available rich labeled datasets. Due to le-
gal restrictions, benign binaries (e.g. exe-
cutables of common Windows applications,
utilities, etc) can not be shared, as they are
often protected by copyright laws. Contrar-
ily, there are websites such as VirusShare
and VXHeaven that share malicious exe-
cutables. However, unlike other domains
where data may be labeled very rapidly by
a non-expert, determining whether a file is
malicious and its corresponding family or
class is a very time-consuming process, even
for security experts. In consequence, for
reproducibility purposes the research con-
ducted in this paper has been evaluated
on the data provided by Microsoft for the
Big Data Innovators Gathering Challenge
of 2015 (Ronen et al., 2018), which over
the years has become the de facto bench-
mark for evaluating approaches on the task
of malware classification. Microsoft pro-
vided a high-quality public labeled bench-
mark of almost half a terabyte of mal-
ware. Nowadays, the dataset is hosted on
Kaggle 6 and is publicly accessible. The
dataset contains samples of malware rep-
resenting a mix of 9 malware families (See
Table 1): (1) Ramnit, (2) Lollipop, (3)
Kelihos_ver3, (4) Vundo, (5) Simda,
6https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-
classification/
(6) Tracur, (7) Kelihos_ver1, (8) Ob-
fuscator.acy and (9) Gatak.
Table 1: Class distribution in the Microsoft Mal-
ware Classification Challenge dataset.








Obfuscator.ACY 1228 Any kind of obfuscated malware
Gatak 1013 Backdoor
6.2. Experimental Setup
The experiments have been carried out
on a machine with an Intel Core i7-7700K
CPU, 4xGeforce GTX 1080Ti and 64Gb
of RAM. All algorithms have been imple-
mented using TensorFlow (Abadi et al.,
2015).
The experimentation has been divided
into two phases. The first phase anal-
yses the individual impact of the meta-
morphic techniques on the performance of
the machine learning models. Oppositely,
the second phase analyzes the usage of the
metamorphic techniques for augmenting the
training set and boosting the performance
of the machine learning classifiers.
6.3. Analysis of the Performance of ML
Classifiers against Metamorphic Tech-
niques
To analyze the performance of the ML
classifiers, the dataset has been divided into
three sets: (1) the training set, (2) the val-
idation set and (3) the test set, containing
70%, 15% and 15% of the samples, respec-
tively.
Instead of the accuracy, the macro F1-
score has been used to evaluate the models.
This is due to the fact that accuracy alone
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can be a misleading measure, specially in
datasets with large class imbalance. For in-
stance, a machine learning model might cor-
rectly predict the value of the majority class
for all predictions and achieve a high clas-
sification accuracy while failing to correctly
predict the class of samples belonging to the
minority and critical classes. In this situa-
tion the macro F1-score metric is more ad-
equate because it penalizes this kind of be-
havior by calculating the unweighted mean
of the precision and recall for each label or
class. The mathematical formulation of the
macro f1-score is as follows:






where F i1 is the weighted average of preci-
sion and recall in class i.
F1 = 2 ·
P ·R
P +R
When evaluating the performance of the
classifiers, the test set is used to generate
three obfuscated test sets (A, B and C) and
the average macro f1-score achieved on the
three sets is provided as outcome.
6.3.1. Dead Code Insertion
To evaluate the resilience of ML mod-
els to the changes performed on the code
by the dead code insertion technique, the
test set has been obfuscated by inserting
10, 50, 100, 200 and 500 dead code in-
structions in random positions within the
assembly language source code of executa-
bles (See Section 4.1). This includes all
sections that contain assembly language in-
structions, and not only the .text section.
Given P = [0.5, 0.071, ..., 0.071] and X =
[NOP, MOV Reg Reg, ...], where |P | and
|X| equals N , P (n) is the probability to
select the X(n) element. Accordingly, the
probability to insert the NOP instruction is
0.5 while the probability to insert any other
instruction is 0.071. The probability val-
ues have been set as described above to put
more focus on the NOP instruction.
Table 2: Comparison of the macro f1-score achieved
by the ML classifiers on the test set obfuscated by
the dead code insertion technique.
Dead code insertion
Method Test Set 10 50 100 200 500
Opcode-based
(Gibert et al., 2017) 0.9852 0.9806 0.9794 0.9711 0.9672 0.8754
NN opcodes (hashing trick) 0.9765 0.9754 0.9738 0.9704 0.9458 0.7031
NN opcodes (mutual information) 0.9876 0.9873 0.9888 0.9887 0.9879 0.9728
Byte-based
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8543 0.8502 0.8497 0.8300 0.8328
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018) 0.8376 0.8030 0.7913 0.7567 0.6944 0.6765
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.8952 0.9015 0.8880 0.8348 0.7818
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.9074 0.9008 0.8880 0.8297 0.7995
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8863 0.8854 0.8864 0.8863 0.8861
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9733 0.9731 0.9694 0.9674 0.9577
Dilated CNN 0.9622 0.9369 0.9362 0.9427 0.9317 0.9280
CNN GLU 0.9627 0.9627 0.9627 0.9623 0.9606 0.9638
Figure 11: Macro f1-score of ML classifiers on the
test set obfuscated by the dead code insertion tech-
nique.
Table 2 and Figure 11 present the clas-
sification performance of the ML classifiers
against the aforementioned obfuscated test
set. It can be observed that the perfor-
mance of the opcode-based methods (Gibert
et al. (2017), NN opcodes (hashing trick))
degrade considerably when more than 200
dead code instructions are inserted per sam-
ple. On the contrary, byte-based classi-
fiers (Raff et al. (2018a); Krčál et al. (2018);
Gibert et al. (2018), NN bytes (hashing
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trick)) remain more stable to the changes
in the executable. There are two reasons
for this occurrence: (1) First, the size of
the executables significantly differ between
families (Gibert et al., 2020a). The less
opcodes has the sample the easy is to ob-
fuscate the patterns learned by the ML
model; (2) Second, samples belonging to
some families in the dataset do not contain
any NOP instruction in their assembly lan-
guage source code such as samples belong-
ing to the Kelihos_ver1 family. This have
caused the opcode-based models to learn
that if there exist a n-gram containing the
NOP instruction in the assembly language
source code, the corresponding executable
might belong to any other family but not
to Kelihos_ver1. For instance, as it can
be observed in Figure 12 the opcode-based
CNN (Gibert et al., 2017) only classified
correctly 27 out of 67 samples of the Keli-
hos_ver1 families. To check this premise, in
Section 6.5 it is augmented the training data
by using a combination of the metamorphic
techniques presented in Section 4, includ-
ing the dead code insertion technique. Re-
sults show that the degradation in the per-
formance of opcode-based classifiers is due
to data bias rather than to any weaknesses
of the opcode-based classifiers with respect
to the byte-based classifiers and could be re-
solved by augmenting the training set with
some samples of those families containing
some NOP instructions.
6.3.2. Register’s Reassignment
The second metamorphic technique eval-
uated is the register’s reassignment tech-
nique (See Section 4.2). To evaluate the
resilience of ML models against the regis-
ter’s reassignment technique, two or more
data registers (i.e. EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX )
of the samples in the test set have been
Figure 12: Opcode-based CNN confusion matrix
(500 dead code insertions).
swapped. More specifically, two experi-
ments have been performed:
• Experiment A: Swap two randomly se-
lected data registers.
• Experiment B: Swap all data registers.
Table 3: Comparison of the macro f1-score achieved
by the ML classifiers on the test set obfuscated by
the register’s reassignment technique.
Register’s Reassignment
Method Test Set A B
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8465 0.8294
DeepConv citepkrcal2018deep 0.8376 0.8136 0.7768
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.8850 0.8954
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.8973 0.8996
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8846 0.8764
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9708 0.9565
Dilated CNN 0.9622 0.9410 0.9308
CNN GLU 0.9627 0.9638 0.9570
Table 3 and Figure 13 present the perfor-
mance of the ML classifiers against the sam-
ples of the test set obfuscated with the reg-
ister’s reassignment technique. Notice that
opcode-based approaches are not evaluated
as they are not affected by this technique.
On the contrary, Malconv’s (Raff et al.,
2018a), DeepConv’s (Krčál et al., 2018), the
shallow CNN and the n-gram based classi-
fier’s performance degraded 2.19%, 7.26%,
1.88% and 1.06% respectively while the
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Figure 13: Macro f1-score of ML classifiers on the
test set obfuscated by the register’s reassignment
technique.
macro f1-score of the methods presented
in Gibert et al. (2018) slightly increased.
Our intuition is that both classifiers (Gib-
ert et al., 2018) as they are based on the
structural entropy of an executable, even
that the register reassignment technique re-
places some bytes in the executable, the en-
tropy time series remain mostly unaltered.
In addition, it can be observed that the per-
formance of the classifiers decreases as the
number of registers swapped augments.
6.3.3. Subroutine Reordering
To evaluate the resilience of ML models
to the modifications performed on the code
by the subroutine reordering technique, the
samples on the test set have been obfuscated
by performing 5, 10, 20 and 50 random sub-
routine permutations (See Section 4.3).
Table 4 and Figure 14 display the per-
formance of the ML models over the ob-
fuscated test set. It can be observed that
the classification performance of all mod-
els remain mostly constant. This is because
most neural network architectures evalu-
ated contain a global max-pooling (Raff
et al., 2018a; Gibert et al., 2017) or global
Table 4: Comparison of the macro f1-score achieved
by the ML classifiers on the test set obfuscated by
the subroutine reordering technique.
Subroutine reorderings
Method Test Set 5 10 20 50
Opcode-based
(Gibert et al., 2017) 0.9852 0.9807 0.9801 0.9798 0.9784
NN opcodes (hashing trick) 0.9765 0.9784 0.9781 0.9785 0.9783
NN opcodes (mutual information) 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9874 0.9874
Byte-based
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8558 0.8391 0.8645 0.8552
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018) 0.8376 0.8025 0.8150 0.7955 0.7903
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.8976 0.8929 0.9026 0.8990
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.9044 0.8998 0.9013 0.9008
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8859 0.8860 0.8852 0.8851
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9732 0.9733 0.9731 0.9734
Dilated CNN 0.9622 0.9465 0.9418 0.9474 0.9560
CNN GLU 0.9627 0.9623 0.9627 0.9626 0.9623
Figure 14: Macro f1-score of ML classifiers on the
test set obfuscated by the subroutine reordering
technique.
avg-pooling layer (Krčál et al., 2018) at
the end of the convolutional layers which
allowed the detection of patterns indepen-
dently of their position in the raw input se-
quences.
6.3.4. Code Reordering through Jumps
The resilience of the ML models against
the code reordering through jumps tech-
nique (See Section 4.4) is assessed by re-
ordering the code with the insertion of 5,
10, 20 and 50 jumps randomly within the
assembly language source code of the exe-
cutables.
Table 5 and Figure 15 present the per-
formance of the ML classifiers against the
samples of the test set obfuscated with the
code reordering through jumps technique.
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Table 5: Comparison of the macro f1-score achieved
by the ML classifiers on the test set obfuscated by
the code reordering through jumps technique.
Code reordering through jumps
Method Test Set 5 10 20 50
Opcode-based
(Gibert et al., 2017) 0.9852 0.9789 0.9776 0.9768 0.9729
NN opcodes (hashing trick) 0.9765 0.9784 0.9777 0.9765 0.9667
NN opcodes (mutual information) 0.9876 0.9874 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876
Byte-based
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8482 0.8573 0.8374 0.8481
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018) 0.8376 0.7547 0.7243 0.7136 0.6749
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.8416 0.8162 0.7671 0.7319
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.8453 0.8195 0.7798 0.7457
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8841 0.8954 0.8907 0.8955
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9732 0.9739 0.9733 0.9743
Dilated CNN 0.9622 0.9503 0.9535 0.9605 0.9609
CNN GLU 0.9627 0.9625 0.9628 0.9627 0.9607
Figure 15: Macro f1-score of ML classifiers on the
test set obfuscated by the code reordering through
jumps technique.
Results are similar to Section 6.3.3 with the
byte-based approaches performing poorly
in comparison to opcode-based approaches,
and additionally, the performance of Deep-
Conv (Krčál et al., 2018), structural entropy
and haar approximation & coefficients (Gib-
ert et al., 2018) degraded considerably from
0.8376, 0.8809, 0.8972 to 0.6749, 0.7319,
0.7457, respectively. At the present mo-
ment we don’t have an explanation for the
behavior of the aforementioned models but
it might be the case that the code reorder-
ing through jumps technique modifies the
initial byte sequences in such a way that
the resulting time series look completely
different from the non-obfuscated versions.
For instance, in Figure 16 it can be ob-
served that the structural entropy visual-
ization of the malicious sample with ID
bxED6RSpmnWV03kyMLoK diverges from
the entropy representation of the version ob-
fuscated by reordering the source code with
the random insertion of 50 jumps. Thus,
if the modifications alter the byte sequence
in a way that the patterns learned by the
ML classifiers do not occur, then the sam-
ple will be misclassified. In addition, the
higher complexity of the aforementioned ar-
chitectures have negatively affected its per-
formance. On the contrary, it can be ob-
served in Figure 15 that the shallow-based
CNN presented in Section 5.2.3 is resilient
to the changes performed by the code re-
ordering through jumps technique.
Figure 16: Structural entropy comparison
between the non-obfuscated and obfuscated
versions of the malicious sample with ID
bxED6RSpmnWV03kyMLoK.
6.3.5. Mixed Obfuscation
Finally, the samples in the test set have
been altered by various combinations of the
four metamorphic techniques to mimic the
changes performed by a metamorphic en-
gine. To this end, four experiments have
been performed:
• Experiment A: Each sample in the
test set has been modified by insert-
ing 10 dead code insertions, performing
10 subroutine reorderings, 10 code re-
orderings through jumps, and by swap-
ping all four data registers.
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• Experiment B: Each sample in the
test set has been modified by insert-
ing 50 dead code insertions, performing
20 subroutine reorderings, 20 code re-
orderings through jumps, and by swap-
ping all four data registers.
• Experiment C: Each sample in the
test set has been modified by inserting
100 dead code insertions, performing
30 subroutine reorderings, 30 code re-
orderings through jumps, and by swap-
ping all four data registers.
• Experiment D: Each sample in the
test set has been modified by inserting
200 dead code insertions, performing
40 subroutine reorderings, 40 code re-
orderings through jumps, and by swap-
ping all four data registers.
Table 6: Comparison of the macro f1-score achieved
by the ML classifiers on the test set obfuscated with
various metamorphic techniques.
Experiment
Method Test Set A B C D
Opcode-based
(Gibert et al., 2017) 0.9852 0.9754 0.9718 0.9632 0.9529
NN opcodes (hashing trick) 0.9765 0.9776 0.9756 0.9618 0.9159
NN opcodes (mutual information) 0.9876 0.9889 0.9889 0.9878 0.9821
Byte-based
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8496 0.8340 0.8353 0.8323
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018) 0.8376 0.6981 0.6746 0.6738 0.6322
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.7988 0.7674 0.7360 0.7115
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.8215 0.7872 0.7533 0.7254
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8715 0.8744 0.8842 0.8727
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9576 0.9499 0.9652 0.9461
Dilated CNN 0.9622 0.9291 0.9376 0.9331 0.9216
CNN GLU 0.9627 0.9578 0.9569 0.9567 0.9570
Table 6 and Figure 17 show the per-
formance of the ML classifiers on the ob-
fuscated test sets. Similarly to the previ-
ous experiments, opcode-based approaches
achieve better results than byte-based ap-
proaches. In addition, it can be observed
that approaches based on the manual ex-
traction of n-gram features are more re-
silient to metamorphic techniques as they
are mostly unaffected by them. On the
other hand, from those approaches based on
deep learning, the opcode-based CNN (Gib-
ert et al., 2017) is the one that achieved
Figure 17: Macro f1-score of ML classifiers on the
test set obfuscated with various metamorphic tech-
niques.
the highest macro f1-score while Deep-
Conv (Krčál et al., 2018) is the ML model
that was most negatively affected by the
modifications in the malware’s code. Our
intuition is that the size of its filters and
the complexity of the network, jointly with
the imbalanced data played a deep role.
6.4. Summary
Table 7 compares the performance of
the ML classifiers on the obfuscated test
sets. To sum up, opcode-based approaches
(Gibert et al. (2017), NN opcodes (hash-
ing trick), LR opcodes (mutual informa-
tion)) perform considerable better than
byte-based approaches (Raff et al. (2018a);
Krčál et al. (2018); Gibert et al. (2018),
NN bytes (hashing trick)), with the logis-
tic regression classifier achieving the high-
est macro f1-score in all the obfuscated sets.
The strong performance of n-gram features
have already been investigated in the lit-
erature, e.g. Zhang et al. (2016) and the
Winner’s solution of the Microsoft Malware




Table 7: Macro F1-score achieved by ML classifiers on the obfuscated test set.
Dead code insertion Register’s reassignment Subroutine reorderings Code reordering through jumps Mixed
Method Test Set 10 50 100 200 500 A B 5 10 20 50 5 10 20 50 A B C D
Opcode-based
(Gibert et al., 2017) 0.9852 0.9806 0.9794 0.9711 0.9672 0.8754 0.9852 0.9852 0.9807 0.9801 0.9798 0.9784 0.9789 0.9776 0.9768 0.9729 0.9754 0.9718 0.9632 0.9529
NN opcodes (hashing trick) 0.9765 0.9754 0.9738 0.9704 0.9458 0.7031 0.9765 0.9765 0.9784 0.9781 0.9785 0.9783 0.9784 0.9777 0.9765 0.9667 0.9776 0.9756 0.9618 0.9159
NN opcodes (mutual information) 0.9876 0.9873 0.9888 0.9887 0.9879 0.9728 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9874 0.9874 0.9874 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9889 0.9889 0.9878 0.9821
Byte-based
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8543 0.8502 0.8497 0.8300 0.8328 0.8465 0.8294 0.8558 0.8391 0.8645 0.8552 0.8482 0.8573 0.8374 0.8481 0.8496 0.8340 0.8353 0.8323
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018) 0.8376 0.8030 0.7913 0.7567 0.6944 0.6765 0.8136 0.7768 0.8025 0.8150 0.7955 0.7903 0.7547 0.7243 0.7136 0.6749 0.6981 0.6746 0.6738 0.6322
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.8952 0.9015 0.8880 0.8348 0.7818 0.8850 0.8954 0.8976 0.8929 0.9026 0.8990 0.8416 0.8162 0.7671 0.7319 0.7988 0.7674 0.7360 0.7115
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.9074 0.9008 0.8880 0.8297 0.7995 0.8973 0.8996 0.9044 0.8998 0.9013 0.9008 0.8453 0.8195 0.7798 0.7457 0.8215 0.7872 0.7533 0.7254
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8863 0.8854 0.8864 0.8863 0.8861 0.8846 0.8764 0.8859 0.8860 0.8852 0.8851 0.8841 0.8954 0.8907 0.8955 0.8715 0.8744 0.8842 0.8727
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9733 0.9731 0.9694 0.9674 0.9577 0.9708 0.9565 0.9732 0.9733 0.9731 0.9734 0.9732 0.9739 0.9733 0.9743 0.9576 0.9499 0.9652 0.9461
Dilated CNN 0.9622 0.9369 0.9362 0.9427 0.9317 0.9280 0.9410 0.9308 0.9465 0.9418 0.9474 0.9560 0.9503 0.9535 0.9605 0.9609 0.9291 0.9376 0.9331 0.9216
CNN GLU 0.9627 0.9627 0.9627 0.9623 0.9606 0.9638 0.9638 0.9570 0.9623 0.9627 0.9626 0.9623 0.9625 0.9628 0.9627 0.9607 0.9579 0.9569 0.9567 0.9570
to be decisive features for the construction
of their classifier.
On the other hand, although deep learn-
ing approaches have shown great adop-
tion in recent years by the cybersecurity
industry, they are still in an early stage
and there still exist margin for improve-
ment. As observed in Table 7, the per-
formance of the deep learning approaches
varies greatly depending on the input of
the network. For instance, the opcode-
based shallow model (Gibert et al., 2017)
performance degraded considerably when
500 random dead code instructions were in-
serted within the source code of the sam-
ples in the test set mainly because some
bias in the dataset. Regarding byte-based
approaches, those that take as input the
raw byte sequences (Raff et al., 2018a;
Krčál et al., 2018) are mostly affected by
the register reassignment technique while
entropy-based approaches (Gibert et al.,
2018) demonstrated robustness against it.
Furthermore, the performance of all deep
learning approaches, indistinctly of their in-
put, show some degradation with respect
to the changes performed by the code re-
ordering through jumps technique. In ad-
dition, it can be observed that there exist
a huge gap in the performance of opcode-
based (Gibert et al., 2017) and byte-based
approaches (Raff et al., 2018a; Krčál et al.,
2018; Gibert et al., 2018) deep learning
kaggle_Microsoft_malware_full
methods in the literature, achieving a macro
f1-score on the test set equals to 0.9852,
0.8480, 0.8376, 0.8972, respectively. This
is because byte-based approaches failed to
correctly classify samples belonging to the
minority classes, e.g. Simda, Obfusca-
tor.ACY, etc. This is attributable to sev-
eral factors: (1) the complexity and depth
of the network architectures; (2) the size
of the filters and (3) class imbalance. As
it is shown in Table 7, the proposed shal-
low architecture trained on the raw bytes
sequences with filters of various sizes rang-
ing from k ∈ {3, 5, 7} achieves a macro f1-
score comparable to the opcode-based ap-
proaches and 14.95% and 16.38% higher
than MalConv’s (Raff et al., 2018a) and
DeepConv’s (Krčál et al., 2018) architec-
tures, respectively. Thus, it demonstrates
that the complexity of the network archi-
tectures played an important role in the
low output achieved by the byte-based mod-
els. In addition, the byte-based shallow
CNN architecture has shown greater robust-
ness against the dead code insertion tech-
nique than their opcode-based counterpart
although it is still affected by the register’s
reassignment technique as all byte-based
approaches.
6.5. Data Augmentation with Adversarial
Examples
Recent advances in deep learning have
been largely attributed to the quantity and
diversity of data. The more data and the
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more variation possible in the data the bet-
ter the generalization of the model will be.
However, in some cases it is not possible
to collect thousands or millions of samples.
In such cases, more data can be generated
from a given dataset. This process is known
as data augmentation. As far as we know,
no data augmentation scheme has been pro-
posed in the literature for the malware do-
main. Following, the use of metamorphic
techniques for augmenting the dataset is in-
vestigated. The main idea behind using the
aforementioned metamorphic techniques to
augment the dataset is that the modifica-
tions preserve the functionality of the ex-
ecutables and are commonly used by mal-
ware authors and thus, it may help build
robust ML models. As observed in Table 1
the training set is very imbalanced, with the
majority class (Kelihos_ver3) containing 70
times more samples than the minority class
(Simda). Subsequently, the number of sam-
ples generated for each family varied con-
siderably, with the samples of the minority
families reused more than the samples in the
majority families to expand the training set.
The total number of samples in the train-
ing set is shown in Table 8. The augmented
training set contains the original sample and
one or more obfuscated versions of it. This
obfuscated versions have been generated us-
ing the following parameters:
• A total of 10 dead code instructions
have been inserted.
• 5 subroutines have been randomly per-
muted.
• The source code has been reordered by
inserting 5 jumps to split the subrou-
tines.
• The registers of a given sample have
been randomly swapped with probabil-
ity p = 0.2.
Table 8: Class distribution in augmented training
set.










Table 9 presents the performance of the
models trained using the augmented train-
ing set on the obfuscated test set. In gen-
eral, all deep learning approaches gained
some robustness against the changes per-
formed by the metamorphic techniques.
It can be observed that byte-based ap-
proaches improved considerably thanks to
the augmented training set. For instance,
MalConv’s (Raff et al., 2018a) and Deep-
Conv’s (Krčál et al., 2018) performance
improved 9.98% and 5.03%, respectively.
However, their models continue to perform
poorly in comparison to the byte-based
shallow CNN (0.9748 macro f1-score on the
test set), the dominant byte-based classi-
fier. On the other hand, the robustness
of the opcode-based CNN (Gibert et al.,
2017) improved considerably with respect
to the modifications performed by the dead
code insertion technique. The macro f1-
score achieved by the opcode-based CNN on
the test set obfuscated by inserting 500 dead
code instructions improved from 0.8754 to
0.9796, an 11.9% increase.
Notice that the macro f1-score achieved
by the shallow CNN approaches, indis-
tinctly of whether they take as input the
bytes or opcode sequences, is close to those
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Table 9: Macro F1-score achieved by ML classifiers on the obfuscated test set trained on the augmented
dataset (AD).
Dead code insertion Register’s Reassignment Subroutine reorderings Code reordering through jumps Mixed
Method Test Set 10 50 100 200 500 A B 5 10 20 50 5 10 20 50 A B C D
Opcode-based
(Gibert et al., 2017) 0.9852 0.9806 0.9794 0.9711 0.9672 0.8754 0.9852 0.9852 0.9807 0.9801 0.9798 0.9784 0.9789 0.9776 0.9768 0.9729 0.9754 0.9718 0.9632 0.9529
(Gibert et al., 2017), AD 0.9850 0.9854 0.9835 0.9855 0.9836 0.9796 0.9850 0.9850 0.9849 0.9848 0.9845 0.9850 0.9835 0.9821 0.9811 0.9781 0,9821 0,9791 0,9787 0,9767
NN opcodes (hashing trick) 0.9765 0.9754 0.9738 0.9704 0.9458 0.7031 0.9765 0.9765 0.9784 0.9781 0.9785 0.9783 0.9784 0.9777 0.9765 0.9667 0.9776 0.9756 0.9618 0.9159
NN opcodes (hashing trick, AD) 0.9862 0.9827 0.9833 0.9734 0.9298 0.7659 0.9862 0.9862 0.9862 0.9862 0.9862 0.9862 0.9859 0.9855 0.9859 0.9820 0,9857 0,9820 0,9684 0,9103
LR opcodes (mutual information) 0.9876 0.9873 0.9888 0.9887 0.9879 0.9728 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9874 0.9874 0.9874 0.9876 0.9876 0.9876 0.9889 0.9889 0.9878 0.9821
LR opcodes (mutual information, AD) 0.9873 0.9875 0.9876 0.9852 0.9858 0.9836 0.9873 0.9873 0.9878 0.9875 0.9875 0.9880 0.9873 0.9875 0.9873 0.9870 0.9875 0,9875 0,9865 0,9865
Byte-based
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a) 0.8480 0.8543 0.8502 0.8497 0.8300 0.8328 0.8465 0.8294 0.8558 0.8391 0.8645 0.8552 0.8482 0.8573 0.8374 0.8481 0.8496 0.8340 0.8353 0.8323
MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a), AD 0.9326 0.9483 0.9399 0.9434 0.9398 0.9422 0,9339 0.9388 0.9427 0.9415 0.9401 0.9396 0.9341 0.9387 0.9404 0.9453 0.9367 0.9346 0,9335 0.9280
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018) 0.8376 0.8030 0.7913 0.7567 0.6944 0.6765 0.8136 0.7768 0.8025 0.8150 0.7955 0.7903 0.7547 0.7243 0.7136 0.6749 0.6981 0.6746 0.6738 0.6322
DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018), AD 0.8797 0.8812 0.8809 0.8680 0.8585 0.8252 0,8762 0.8712 0.8804 0.8802 0.8760 0.8741 0.8653 0.8650 0.8513 0.8523 0.8541 0,8474 0,8409 0,8388
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8809 0.8952 0.9015 0.888 0.8348 0.7818 0.8850 0.8954 0.8976 0.8929 0.9026 0.8990 0.8416 0.8162 0.7671 0.7319 0.7988 0.7674 0.7360 0.7115
Structural entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018), AD 0.8904 0.8996 0.9022 0.8941 0.9223 0.8904 0,8988 0.8941 0.8987 0.8970 0.9012 0.9019 0.9023 0.8911 0.8796 0.8759 0.8806 0.8887 0,8744 0,8678
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018) 0.8972 0.9074 0.9008 0.8880 0.8297 0.7995 0.8973 0.8996 0.9044 0.8998 0.9013 0.9008 0.8453 0.8195 0.7798 0.7457 0.8215 0.7872 0.7533 0.7254
Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018), AD 0.9261 0.9244 0.9256 0.9305 0.9286 0.8335 0,9264 0.9319 0.9241 0.9233 0.9282 0.9244 0.9182 0.9215 0.897 0.8954 0.9179 0,9052 0.8945 0.8784
NN bytes (hashing trick) 0.8858 0.8863 0.8854 0.8864 0.8863 0.8861 0.8846 0.8764 0.8859 0.8860 0.8852 0.8851 0.8841 0.8954 0.8907 0.8955 0.8715 0.8744 0.8842 0.8727
NN bytes (hashing trick, AD) 0.9539 0.9498 0.9474 0.9492 0.9492 0.9465 0,9410 0.9363 0.9491 0.9522 0.9494 0.9489 0.9491 0.9437 0.9464 0.9403 0.9439 0.9349 0.9448 0,9360
Shallow CNN 0.9748 0.9733 0.9731 0.9694 0.9674 0.9577 0.9708 0.9565 0.9732 0.9733 0.9731 0.9734 0.9732 0.9739 0.9733 0.9743 0.9576 0.9499 0.9652 0.9461
Shallow CNN, AD 0.9765 0.9762 0.9740 0.9744 0.9745 0.9609 0,9723 0.9748 0.9763 0.9762 0.9760 0.9712 0.9765 0.9769 0.976 0.9753 0.9690 0,9734 0,9718 0,9618
obtained by the n-gram based approaches.
In the case of the byte-based CNN it
achieves higher macro f1-score than the n-
gram based approach while the opcode-
based CNN macro f1-score is marginally
lower than the n-gram based counterpart.
Thus, demonstrating that deep learning ap-
proaches are a good alternative to n-gram
based approaches without the computa-
tional and memory costs of having to ex-
haustively enumerate millions of features
and manually perform feature extraction
and selection during training.
7. Conclusions & Future Work
This paper provides an exhaustive eval-
uation of the vulnerability of state-of-the-
art anti-malware engines to the changes in
the source code generated by the follow-
ing metamorphic techniques: (1) the dead
code insertion technique, (2) the register’s
reassignment technique, (3) the subroutine
reordering technique and (4) the code re-
ordering through jumps technique. Re-
sults show that byte-based approaches per-
form poorly in comparison with opcode-
based approaches and are not robust to the
changes caused by the register’s reassign-
ment technique. Their lower yield is at-
tributable to several factors: (1) the size of
the filters, (2) the complexity of the net-
work and (3) the data imbalance. On the
other hand, the shallow architecture pre-
sented in this paper has achieved an im-
provement of 14.95% and 16.38% with re-
spect to MalConv’s (Raff et al., 2018a)
and DeepConv’s (Krčál et al., 2018) ar-
chitectures, respectively, and attains simi-
lar classification performance in comparison
to opcode-based approaches (Gibert et al.,
2017). Furthermore, the usage of meta-
morphic techniques to augment the train-
ing set has been investigated. Results show
that the classification performance of deep
learning approaches improves considerably
and gain robustness against metamorphism
independently of their input data. Thus,
we demonstrate the feasibility of augment-
ing the training data, and in particular the
number of samples belonging to the minor-
ity classes, by employing metamorphic tech-
niques for the malware classification task.
A future line of research is the exploration
of encryption and compression techniques,
and the investigation of their effects in ML
classifiers.
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Appendix A. Neural Network Architectures.
Appendix A.1. Shallow CNN (Gibert et al., 2017).
Raw MnemonicsN
4-dimensiomal EmbeddingN × 4
Conv 5 (stride 1)100Conv 3 (stride 1)100 Conv 7 (stride 1)100 ReLU
Global Max Pooling100Global Max Pooling100 Global Max Pooling100
Feature Concatenation300
Softmax9
Figure A.18: Opcode-based shallow convolutional neural network (Gibert et al., 2017).
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Appendix A.2. MalConv (Raff et al., 2018a).
Raw BytesN
8-dimensiomal EmbeddingN × 8






Figure A.19: MalConv architecture (Raff et al., 2018a).
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Appendix A.3. DeepConv (Krčál et al., 2018).
Raw BytesN
8-dimensiomal EmbeddingN × 8
Conv 32 (Stride 4)48
Conv 32 (Stride 4)96
Max Pooling 496
ReLU
Conv 16 (stride 8)128







Figure A.20: DeepConv architecture (Krčál et al., 2018).
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Appendix A.4. Structural entropy CNN and Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018)
Structural EntropyN
Conv 3 (Stride 1)50
Max Pooling 250
ReLU
Conv 3 (stride 1)70
Max Pooling 270





Figure A.21: Structural Entropy CNN (Gibert et al., 2018).
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Haar approximationN/2 Haar detailsN/2
Conv 3x2 (Stride 1)50
Max Pooling 250
ReLU
Conv 3 (stride 1)70
Max Pooling 270





Figure A.22: Multiresolution CNN (Gibert et al., 2018).
31
